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BOOK REVIEWS
Reviewed by Bernard Robert Adams*
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH, by
Raoul Berger, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1974. 430 pp. $14.95.
At 10:30 Sunday morning, September 8, 1974, President Gerald
R. Ford issued to Richard M. Nixon a "full, free, and absolute pardon"
for all acts which may be crimes committed during Mr. Nixon's term
of office. With this act, the "Watergate era," as least as far as the
conduct of the President may have been concerned, is officially at an
end. With this decision, any further investigation as to the culpability
of Richard M. Nixon is officially at a close; also, preempted are ques-
tions of legal significance which were prompted by the Watergate
break in and subsequent acts of coverup. One of those questions re-
lates to the authority of the President of the United States to withhold
documents, in whatever shape or form, from the Congress and the
courts.
While the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon' did decide
that President Nixon had to deliver certain tapes and documents to
Judge Sirica for an in camera inspection, it necessarily left many
questions about executive privilege unanswered by confining itself to
the narrow facts of the case. Thus, the Supreme Court's opinion applies
predominantly to those situations where the documents bear evidence
dealing with criminal conduct presently under investigation.2 The
larger debate on the full contours of the executive privilege doctrine
is still to be ultimately and finally resolved.
While the Nixon case in its largest form presented an historically
dramatic confrontation between the Executive and Legislative De-
partments and raised the spectre of confrontation between a Presi-
dent and the courts, it did not represent a conclusion to the debate
over the extent of the public's right of access to governmental in-
formation. This debate and refinement will not be confined to the
conduct of relations between the office of the President and other
branches of government; all citizens have an interest in the avail-
ability of information upon which government action is based.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Franklin T. Backus School of Law, Case Western Reserve
University. A.B., Brown University; LL.B., Yale Law School.
1----. U.S ....... 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
2..... U.S. 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3105, 3108, 3109 (1974).
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Often, a specific citizen, be he a government official or a private
citizen, has need for a bit of data or a fact which was the basis of a
decision made by a department of government. 3 If the governmental
agency which made the decision is part of the executive branch, it is
possible for the department head through the use of Presidential
power to attempt to shield that data from public disclosure. 4 It is the
potential conflict between an agency's perceived need for confidenti-
ality and the individual's right to know which forms the heart of the
problem of executive privilege.
On a more institutional level, the ability to control information
is the ability to shape public opinion and to control the processes of
government. Our government has been sensitive to abuses of office,
and its tripartite form attempts to allocate, balance, and divide power
in such way that government shall always be fairly and justly admin-
istered. However, in order for the government process to work, those
participants in governmental action who would attempt to act in a
wise and fair fashion need information upon which to base their
decisions. It is the ability, therefore, to gather, to assess and to inter-
pret this data which is perhaps the key to power in the United States.
In addition to information being the basis of decision making, full
access to facts is the basis for governmental control. It is only if each
branch of government can understand what the others are doing that
it is possible for them to exercise their constitutional functions of
coordination, supervision and review. It is here, therefore, that the
confines of the debate about executive privilege become crucial. If it
is possible for the occupant of the Oval Office to control the flow of
information about his conduct and the conduct of those people who
are working directly under him, it is also possible for that occupant
to shield from the public view the true direction of the course of the
nation. It is here that one realizes the importance of full and free
disclosure.
Congress, in passing the Freedom of Information Act,5 attempted
to make full and free disclosure of facts and data possessed by the
various branches of the executive department the rule. However,
Congress fully realized that there might be circumstances where dis-
closure would not benefit the country and where it might do positive
harm either to individuals or to the nation as a whole. In this context,
3 This need can be articulated by a litigant during discovery under FED. R. Civ. P. 26, cf.
US. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), or by a request under the "Freedom of Information
Act," 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970); cf. Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969),
afl'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
4 This withholding could be supported by a general claim of executive privilege or by a
more specific reference to one of the nine possible exceptions to disclosure in the Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1) (9) (1970).
55 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). While the general purpose of the Act is full access to informa-
tion, the statute itself contains grounds that would justify secrecy. See note 4, supra.
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the idea of an executive privilege comes to the fore. Executive priv-
ilege is designed to protect state secrets or items bearing on the na-
tional defense and security from unwarranted disclosure. 6 As Mr.
Justice Burger pointed out in the Nixon case, what is important in the
context of executive privilege is a balancing; a balancing of the need
to know; the importance of knowledge, when compared to the need of
the nation as a whole; and the need for self-preservation and security.
7
On a more routine level, privilege is a topic that lawyers deal
with in a great many situations. The attorney-client privilege is one
for which lawyers should have a great sense of understanding. The
need to encourage a client to speak openly and freely so that the
lawyer can gather the facts is perhaps at the root of this privilege
of protecting a client's disclosure to his counsel. With this in mind,
it should not be hard to realize that many of the same determinants
behind the ordinary attorney-client evidentiary privileges can be
expanded and made more important with respect to the idea of execu-
tive privilege. Not only are we concerned with preserving the security
of the country, but we are concerned with strengthening the processes
by which decisions are made. It is important, if not crucial, for the
President to be able to know that his advisors will speak openly and
candidly without fear of retribution for their opinions if their judg-
ments turn out to be ill considered in the course of debate. It is im-
portant for us as a people to know that those men to whom we have
given power will not limit the free exchange of ideas among them-
selves out of a concern for having statements attributed to them in
public that they would be much happier to leave as private statements.
Yet, given all of this, it is still important for us as a people that we
not overly shield, overly insulate, and overly protect those very same
men we want to encourage to debate. It is with this sense of balance,
that the topic of executive privilege must be approached.
In his book Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth, Raoul
Berger traces the origins and development of the doctrine of execu-
tive privilege. In addition, Mr. Berger outlines those rationales which
would support the withholding of information. However, Mr. Berger,
in scholarly fashion, completely refutes the justifications for a broad
holding of executive privilege and attempts to sketch in a logical and
forceful manner those reasons that militate in favor of the narrowest
possible reading of executive privilege as an abstract proposition. It
is his view that if executive privilege is to be invoked, it is for the
courts, on a case by case basis, to do that which must be done: balance
the interests of the executive against the need for information in
6 A full definition of the concept is provided by Berger as . . . "the President's claim of
constitutional authority to withhold information from Congress . . ." and the "judicial
branch." BERGER EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, p. 1 supra and notes 1-3 supra.
7 ..... U.S ........ 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3107, 3111 (1974).
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society. In support of his case, Mr. Berger reveals as slim reeds those
historical "precedents" which have been invoked consistently by the
defenders of executive privilege. Each refutation is thoroughly re-
searched and documented. Mr. Berger's technique is to develop each
rationalization for executive privilege and then strip away its legal
and historical justifications. The reader is left with the defender's
feeble skeleton of policy arguments, and, thanks to Mr. Berger, well
prepared to evaluate them.
If the reader were to attempt to characterize Raoul Berger's
Executive Privilege, the words thorough, comprehensive, and persua-
sive would initially be applied. However, some other more unfortu-
nate modifiers also could be appended to the list. The book is dense.
Reading Executive Privilege is an exhausting experience. The book
lacks momentum. One finishes it with a feeling of agreement with Mr.
Berger, but unable to reconstruct the argument. In addition, the book
appears to suffer from one fault that did not beset Mr. Berger's
earlier work on impeachment. 8 While Impeachment was written over
a period of years and its publication happened to coincide with na-
tional events, Executive Privilege seems to have been rushed to press
because of the timeliness of the topic and the success of its predecessor.
The book draws most heavily on a series of older law review articles
written by Mr. Berger. As a result, parts of the book do not fit
together as well as they should.
On final analysis, however, Raoul Berger's work is an excellent
legal source book for the interested, albeit committed, reader. Execu-
tive Privilege provides the only exhaustive study of a very important
topic, not just in the confines of our most recent national tragedy, but
in the longer term perspective. The discussion goes beyond the prob-
lems of a particular President to deal with the problems of American
society. It is in this sense that Mr. Berger's book will achieve its impor-
tance; for with its discussion of the place of executive privilege in our
national decision making, Raoul Berger's book fulfills its function. In
the years to come, the final decisions will be made by courts as to the
parameters of the doctrine of executive privilege. In all likelihood,
these decisions will be made with continuing reference to Executive
Privilege: A Constitutional Myth.
8 R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1974).
1974]
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Reviewed by Daniel M. Migliore*
JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW, by Leonard Baker, New
York, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. 770 pp. $17.95.
Amidst the turbulance and passion of the American Revolution,
few men are as distinctive as John Marshall. Whether exhorting the
minutemen, winning glowing plaudits from fellow lawyers, ascending
to eminence as a diplomat, or preserving the institutional power of the
Supreme Court as Chief Justice, John Marshall's life glitters richly
with compassion and integrity.
Leonard Baker's biography of Marshall is a solid work, fre-
quently compelling thoughtful considerations of the vast implications
that Marshall's diverse career had on that society he served with such
salience. Baker's work, portioned soldier, lawyer, diplomat, and judge,
illuminates those cultural and professional values to which zealous
loyalists pledged their allegiance. The portrayal of Marshall's con-
tinuity of ideologic commitment, often out of cadence with popular
persuasions, puts the frustration, dedication, and conflict of the era
into sharp focus.
Marshall, the son of an industrious and successful landowner,
was a precocious child and a voracious student. Equipped with formi-
dable intelligence and a disciplined temper, Marshall, at 19, served as
a commander in the military. During the early years of the revolution,
Marshall fought in numerous battles of noted historical moment.
These encounters served to reinforce his well learned respect for
property and enlighten his attitude toward slavery. Marshall's affec-
tion for the military continued after the signing of the Declaration
of Independence. His prowess as a leader and close relationship with
George Washington provided Marshall with access to many of the
army's crowned jewels. He was recognized through decoration and
towed into Washington's command group, a courtship later to bear a
wealth of fruit for John Marshall. After being discharged at the age
of twenty-four, his high regard for economic security and interest in
fashioning a "just system of law" persuaded him to pursue a formal
education. He enrolled in the College of William and Mary.
Marshall was a popular and successful student. Although dis-
tractingly enamoured of one Polly from Yorktown, whom he later
married, he achieved membership in Phi Beta Kappa. Marshall's
indulgence in formal education proved quite modest. One year after
entering college he successfully petitioned Governor Thomas Jefferson
* Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, The Cleveland State University College of
Law.
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for a license to practice law. That Marshall's legal career began with
the imprimatur of Jefferson is not without irony considering the en-
mity that later developed between them.
Marshall's reputation as a skilled Richmond lawyer rose meteor-
ically. Distinguishably casual in attire and style, he won praise from
professional colleagues, clients, and community acquaintances. His
success in court and popularity in Richmond converged in 1782 with
his election to the General Assembly. Public service, however, soon
proved his private torment. Beliefs impressed upon him during child-
hood were often out of rhythm with prevailing political attitudes.
The most thorny and perplexing issue to Marshall at that time was
the Jeffersonian campaign for religious freedom in Virginia. Although
deeply concerned about the preservation of individual liberty, Mar-
shall was unable to abandon his commitment to the established church
in order to support the mandates of religious freedom. Marshall did
not seek re-election but spent the next few years practicing law, estab-
lishing his family, and pondering the problems that had beset the
United States after the revolution.
Increased social ferment developed under the Articles of Con-
federation and the principles of voluntarism. The result of this agi-
tation was the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Marshall, instinc-
tively gravitating toward federalism, publicly urged the strengthening
of the central government. In the months that followed, Marshall,
through debate and address, illuminated his allegiance to a federalist
government. After his efforts were rewarded with Virginia's ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, he returned to his prospering law practice in
Richmond. This serenity and comfort was not long to be enjoyed by
John Marshall. For, as Baker posits in one of his most pithy plums,
"America does not permit its citizens such luxuries." Baker adjusts
historical context and styles Marshall's renewed sense of responsibil-
ity as a commitment to "refresh the tree of liberty." Although with
considerably less drama, Marshall again became involved with prob-
lems of national import.
By 1973 the excesses of the French Revolution had begun to rend
the fabric of the American society. President Washington, favoring
American neutrality, charged Marshall with the responsibility of sell-
ing the administration's stance and parrying Jeffersonian insistence
on intervention. The resulting Jay Treaty, coined a sellout of Ameri-
can dignity, catapulted Marshall from a frontrunning Virginian fed-
eralist to a leading federalist in the nation. With difficulties in France
exacerbating, President Adams sought a more politically acceptable
mode of negotiations. He named three persons as envoys and mem-
bers plenipotentiary to France. Unlike the other two appointments,
Marshall had not demonstrated proclivities toward public service.
However, his deep interest in the French crises persuaded him to
accept the office.
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Although Marshall lacked diplomatic acuity, his craft as an advo-
cate and mastery of sound judgment quickly gained him respect. Mar-
shall's talents were not long left untested. Recently defrocked Talley-
rand, then minister of France, met Marshall's aversion to conciliation
with noted sophistication. Talleyrand sought to weaken American
standing and bloat French coffers while staging clandestine meetings
with each American. Marshall's insistence on open negotiations and
a settlement which would not compromise America's ability to remain
independent survived the drama of Talleyrand's Machiavellian tact.
Despite the diminished effectiveness of the envoy and the distasteful
notoriety it received, Marshall's reputation remained unblemished. As
anticipated however, the posture of the negotiations precipitated a
healthy rub between the Jeffersonian republicans and John Marshall,
an ardent conflict soon to become more acute.
Marshall returned to Richmond in 1799 intending to resume the
practice of law and reacquaint himself with his family, but the
political atmosphere in Richmond dictated an alternate course. With
the congressional election nearing, federalists sought a formidable
opponent for the Jeffersonian incumbent. John Marshall was the most
logical choice. Although unimpressed with the proposition, Marshall
yielded under the advisement of George Washington. Marshall's can-
didacy drew party division into sharp focus. Federalists believed
Jeffersonian indignations inimical to the national welfare, while Jeffer-
sonians accused federalists of an enmity toward republicanism and a
desire to introduce a British modeled monarchy. Although federalist
certainty lessened as the political tempest heightened, Marshall won
the election by a scant majority.
As a congressman, Marshall remained responsive to public de-
mand, yet dedicated to his personal conviction. He sustained his
"strong attachment" to popularity but continued to be indisposed to
sacrifice his integrity. Shortly after Marshall's introduction to Con-
gress, President Adams purged a portion of his cabinet and nominated
Marshall as Secretary of War. Three days after his confirmation,
Marshall was re-nominated, this time as Secretary of State. He re-
mained in this capacity until his nomination to the United States
Supreme Court in 1801.
During the waning days of his administration, President Adams
feared the demise of the federalist party. The appointment of John
Marshall, while serving to retard this cessation, helped fashion the
courts as political battle grounds. Jeffersonians perceived the Supreme
Court, in particular, the principal target of attack.
Despite the innocuousness of the early Marshall court, his argu-
ments and decisions displayed a solid dialectic, a unique responsive-
ness and a strict devotion to the preservation of the Court as the
primary interpreter of the Constitution. Amidst a hive of controversy,
[Vol. 23:574
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Marshall firmly styled the posture of the Court. In Marbury v. Madi-
son' he enunciated the hearty doctrine of judicial review, a broaden-
ing of judicial authority so disarming that Jeffersonians called for a
general purgation of the judiciary. The test, however, of the Court's
independence and "exceptional moralty" surfaced in 1807 in the trial
of Aaron Burr.
Burr was accused of attempting to dismember the nation. Mar-
shall suspected that while a conviction would serve to vindicate and,
worse yet, popularize President Jefferson for having publically pro-
nounced Burr a traitor, a finding of innocence would precipitate dis-
trust in the integrity and neutrality of the Court. Marshall scrutinized
the facts and pondered the enigmatic motivations of Burr with his
usual calm and persevering circumspection, while Jefferson became
increasingly suspicious of judicial vengeance. The trial closed with
the jury finding that Burr "is not proved to be guilty under this in-
dictment," but Marshall's involvement did not cease. He was burned
in effigy, criticized in newspapers and denounced in speeches.
Through the remaining twenty-seven years of his sitting, Mar-
shall presided over numerous landmark cases. Among these are:
McCulloch v. Maryland,2 Dartmouth College v. Woodward,3 Fletcher
v. Peck4 and Gibbons v. Ogden.5 After his retirement in 1834, he was
active in clubs, distinguished societies, and prestigious community
organizations. Marshall bore his declining health stoically. Shortly
before his death he said "could I find the mill which would grind old
men and restore youth, I might indulge .... but as that is impossible,
I must be content with patching myself up and dragging on as well as
I can." On July 6, 1835, Marshall died.
Baker's work ably tows the reader through the elaborate edifice
that was John Marshall's career. The study was mostly scholarly and
well written. Despite an excess of the breast-beating of grand Amer-
ica, Baker offers a fair overview by flushing out Marshall's traits and
preferences. He neglects, however, to posit even a whispered mea
culpa for those preferences meriting a healthy contrition. The presen-
tations of Marshall's judicial opinions, albeit a cogent digest, is
analytically sluggish and less than illuminating on the societal values
they served. Let me conclude however, that if the reader can endure
Baker's bias, his passage through the book will be satisfactory and
rewarding.
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
4 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
122 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
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